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policymakers in the twenty-first century. Assessing a globally efficient time path for pricing or 
controlling greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions is difficult enough, with huge scientific uncertainties, 
disagreement over the ultimate goals of climate policy, and disagreement over which countries should 
bear most responsibility for emissions reductions. On top of this, domestic policy design is inherently 
difficult because of multiple, and sometimes conflicting, criteria for policy evaluation. And at an 
international level, there are multiple approaches to coordinating emissions control agreements. What 
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Designing Climate Mitigation Policy 
Joseph E. Aldy, Alan J. Krupnick, Richard G. Newell,  
Ian W.H. Parry, and William A. Pizer ∗ 
1. Introduction 
Global warming is one of the most critical and also most daunting challenges facing 
policymakers in the twenty-first century. Assessing a globally efficient time path for pricing or 
controlling greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions is difficult enough, with huge scientific 
uncertainties, disagreement over the ultimate goals of climate policy, and disagreement over 
which countries should bear most responsibility for emissions reductions. On top of this, 
domestic policy design is inherently difficult because of multiple, and sometimes conflicting, 
criteria for policy evaluation. And at an international level, there are multiple approaches to 
coordinating emissions control agreements. What should be a rational policy response for such 
an enormously complex problem?  
This paper attempts to provide some broad answers to this question, and pinpoint the 
main sources of controversy, by pulling together key findings from diverse literatures on 
mitigation costs, damage valuation, policy instrument choice, technological innovation, and 
international climate policy. Given that our target audience is the broader economics profession 
(rather than the climate specialist) our discussion is highly succinct and avoids details. 
We begin with the broadest issue of how much action to price or control GHGs is 
warranted in the near and longer term, at a global level. There are two distinct approaches to this 
question. The cost-effectiveness approach acknowledges that policymakers typically have some 
ultimate target for limiting the amount of projected climate change or atmospheric GHG 
accumulations, and the question is what policy trajectory might achieve alternative goals at 
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minimum economic cost, accounting for practical constraints, such as incomplete international 
coordination. The other approach is to weigh the benefits and costs of slowing climate change, 
which introduces highly contentious issues in damage valuation, dealing with extreme climate 
risks, and inter-generational discounting. 
The second part of the paper deals with issues in the implementation of climate policy. At 
a domestic (US) level these include a comparison of alternative emissions control instruments 
and how they should be designed to simultaneously promote administrative ease and minimize 
efficiency costs in the presence of other policy distortions, abatement cost uncertainty, and 
possible distributional constraints. We also discuss the extent to which additional policies are 
warranted to promote the development and deployment of emissions-saving technologies. And 
we briefly summarize emerging literature on alternative international policy architectures. A 
final section discusses key areas for future research. 
2. Policy Stringency 
2.1. Emissions Pricing to Stabilize Global Climate 
The cost-effectiveness approach to global climate policy uses models of the economic 
and climate system (known as integrated assessment models) to estimate the emissions price 
trajectory that minimizes the discounted worldwide costs of emissions abatement, subject to a 
climate stabilization target, and possibly other, practical constraints like delaying developing 
country participation. These models range from bottom-up engineering-economic models with 
considerable detail on adoption and use of energy technologies, to computable general 
equilibrium models with a more aggregated and continuous structure that better represents 
demand responses, capital dynamics and factor substitution. Many models are hybrids containing 
substantial technological detail in the energy sectors, and more aggregate representation in 
others. Typically the suite of existing and emerging technologies is taken as given, though some 
models capture induced innovation through learning-by-doing, and a few have incorporated 
R&D-based technological change (e.g., Goulder and Matthai 2000).  
The choice of model structure is generally less important than assumptions about future 
baseline data and technology options. Future mitigation costs are highly sensitive to business-as-
usual (BAU) emissions, which depend on future population and GDP growth, the energy-
intensity of GDP, and the fuel mix. They also depend on the future availability and cost of 
emissions-saving technologies like nuclear and renewable power, carbon capture and storage, 
and alternative transportation fuels. Considerable uncertainty surrounds all of these factors.    Resources for the Future  Aldy et al. 
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Given the difficulty of judging which models give the most reliable predictions, we 
discuss a representative sample of results, beginning with studies that assume emissions 
reductions are efficiently allocated across countries and time, and using the least expensive 
technological options (this is known as “where, when, and how” flexibility). The results, 
summarized in Table 1, are from the US Climate Change Science Program (CCSP, Product 
2.1A), based on results from three widely regarded models (see Clarke 2007 et al. for details), 
and from the Stanford Energy Modeling Forum’s EMF-21 study (reported in de la Chesnaye and 
Weyant 2006) based on 16 models.  
2.1.1. Reference Scenarios 
Global CO2 emissions from fossil fuels have grown from about 2 billion (metric) tons in 
1900 to current levels of about 30 billion tons and, in the absence of mitigation policy, are 
projected to roughly triple 2000 levels by the end of the century (Table 1). The huge bulk of the 
projected future emissions growth is in “non-Annex 1” (non-industrial) countries—CO2 
emissions from these countries have just overtaken those from “Annex 1” (industrial) countries.1 
These rising emissions trends reflect growing energy demand from population and real income 
growth outweighing energy- and emissions-saving technological change—traditional fossil fuels 
still account for around three-quarters of global primary energy consumption by 2100 (Clarke et 
al. 2007, Table TS1).2  
About 55 percent of CO2 releases are immediately absorbed by the upper oceans and 
terrestrial biosphere while the remainder enters the atmosphere and is removed by the ocean and 
terrestrial sinks only very gradually (IPCC 2007). The longer term rate of removal of CO2 from 
the atmosphere is around 1 percent a year (i.e., CO2 has an expected atmospheric residence time 
of about a century), and even this very gradual decay rate might decline as oceans become more 
saturated with CO2. Stabilizing atmospheric CO2 concentrations over the very long term 
essentially requires elimination of fossil fuel and other GHG emissions.  
                                                 
1 The 1990 UN Framework Convention on Climate Change grouped countries into either Annex 1, or non-Annex 1, 
according to their per capita income at that time. Only Annex 1 countries agreed to reduce emissions under the 1997 
Kyoto Protocol.  
2 Land-use changes currently contribute about an additional 5.5 billion tons of CO2 releases (primarily through 
deforestation in developing countries for agriculture and timber) though these sources are projected to grow at a 
much slower pace than fossil fuel emissions (IPCC 2007). Land-use CO2 emissions are not priced in the models in 
Table 1. Resources for the Future  Aldy et al. 
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Atmospheric CO2 concentrations increased from pre-industrial levels of about 280 parts 
per million (ppm) to 384 ppm in 2007, and are projected to rise to around 700-900 ppm by 2100 
(Table 1). Accounting for non-CO2 GHGs, such as methane and nitrous oxides from agriculture, 
and expressing them on a lifetime warming equivalent basis, the CO2-equivalent concentration is 
about 430 ppm (IPCC 2007). Total GHG concentrations in CO2-equivalents are projected to 
reach 550 ppm (i.e., about double pre-industrial levels) by around mid century. 
Globally-averaged surface temperature is estimated to have risen by 0.74°C between 
1906 and 2006, with most of this warming due to rising atmospheric GHG concentrations, as 
opposed to other factors like changes in solar radiation, volcanic activity, and urban heat 
absorption (IPCC 2007). Figure 1, from IPCC (2007), shows projected the long run warming 
associated with different stabilization levels for atmospheric CO2 equivalent concentrations (the 
climate system takes several decades to fully adjust to changing concentration levels, due to 
gradual heat diffusion processes in the oceans). If CO2 equivalent concentrations were stabilized 
at 450, 550 and 650 ppm, mean projected warming over pre-industrial levels is 2.1, 2.9 and 
3.6°C respectively. Figure 1 also indicates “likely ranges” of warming about the mean projection, 
which refer to an approximate 66 percent confidence interval, based on sensitivity analysis from 
scientific models—for example, the likely warming range for 550 ppm CO2 equivalent 
stabilization is 1.9−4.4°C. The fundamental concern is that warming might greatly exceed these 
ranges due to poorly understood feedbacks not represented in these models, such as heat-induced 
releases of methane stored under the oceans and in the permafrost.  
2.1.2. Least-Cost Pricing 
Most economic analysis has focused on climate stabilization targets that are 
approximately consistent with limiting atmospheric CO2 concentrations to either 450 or 550 ppm 
(with other GHGs included, CO2 equivalent concentrations would be stabilized at approximately 
530 and 670 ppm respectively). The studies in Table 1 examine globally cost-effective pricing of 
all GHGs that are approximately consistent with these goals.3  
                                                 
3 The G-8 countries recently adopted a target of limiting projected warming to 2
oC above pre-industrial levels. This 
would require ultimately stabilizing CO2-equivalent concentrations at 450 ppm, which is considerably more 
stringent than the 450 ppm CO2 target discussed here. In fact, with current technologies, it is difficult to see how the 
more stringent target could be achieved (even allowing for transitory overshooting), given that current concentration 
levels are already approaching this target. Resources for the Future  Aldy et al. 
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Across the models and stabilization scenarios in Table 1, CO2 emissions prices (in year 
2000 dollars) rise steadily (beginning around year 2012) at approximately 5 percent a year, 
where this figure is the consumer discount rate plus the atmospheric CO2 decay rate (Peck and 
Wan 1996). However, one striking feature in Table 1 is the considerable price variation across 
models within a stabilization scenario, reflecting different assumptions about future BAU 
emissions growth and future costs of carbon-saving technologies. The other striking feature is the 
dramatic differences between the 550 and 450 ppm CO2 stabilization targets. In the 550 ppm 
case, CO2 prices are $3-26 and $10-99 per ton in 2025 and 2050 respectively, with global 
emissions 17-41 percent and 13-56 percent above 2000 levels at these dates, respectively. In the 
450 ppm case, CO2 prices are 3-16 times those in the 550 ppm case to mid century, while 
emissions are 3-14 percent and 36-47 percent below 2000 levels in 2025 and 2050 respectively.4  
Although GDP losses may be an unreliable proxy for efficiency losses we discuss them 
here as they are the least common denominator reported by the modeling groups. Under the 550 
ppm CO2 target, most models project global GDP losses (from reducing both CO2 and non-CO2 
GHGs) of less than 1 percent out to 2050, though some models suggest GDP losses could reach 
2-3 percent by this date. In present value terms, these losses amount to about $0.4-12 trillion out 
to 2050 when applied to a world GDP that is $60 trillion and growing (Newell 2008, pp. 12). 
Under the 450 ppm CO2 target, GDP losses are about 1.0-2.5 percent and 1.5-5.5 percent in 2025 
and 2050 respectively or about $8-43 trillion in present value from 2010 to 2050.  
Under both the 450 and 550 ppm CO2 stabilization scenarios the energy system is 
transformed over the next century (though at very different rates), through energy conservation, 
improved energy efficiency, and particularly reductions in the carbon intensity of energy. Most 
of the emissions reductions in the first two to three decades occur in the power sector, largely 
through the progressive replacement of traditional coal plants by coal with carbon capture and 
storage, natural gas, nuclear, and renewables (wind, solar, and biomass). However, the projected 
fuel mix is highly sensitive to speculative assumptions about the relative costs and availability of 
future technologies. For example, there are considerable practical obstacles to the expansion of 
nuclear power (because of safety issues), renewables (because sites are typically located far from 
                                                 
4 Some analysts express prices per ton of carbon rather than CO2. To convert to $ per ton of carbon, multiply by the 
ratio of molecular weights, 44/12=3.67. Resources for the Future  Aldy et al. 
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population centers), and carbon capture and storage (because of the difficulty of assigning sub-
surface property rights).5  
As for US CO2 emissions, in the BAU case they increase by about 30-100 percent above 
2000 levels (of approximately 6 billion tons) by mid century (Table 1). Under the 550 CO2 ppm 
target, emissions initially rise, then fall to roughly 2000 levels by 2050, and fall rapidly 
thereafter. Under the 450 ppm target, US emissions are rapidly reduced to roughly half 2000 
levels by 2050.6 US-specific GDP losses are not reported in the studies in Table 1, but allocating 
a quarter of the global cost to the United States (based on its share in global GDP) implies a 
present value cost to the United States through mid century of about $0.1-3 trillion (0-1 percent 
of the present value of GDP) for the 550 ppm target and $2-11 trillion (1-3 percent of present 
value GDP) for the 450 ppm target.7 
2.1.3. Deviations from Least-Cost Pricing  
Aside from the uncertainty surrounding modeling assumptions, a key qualification to the 
studies in Table 1 is that they assume globally efficient abatement policies. More likely, 
particularly given the “common but differentiated responsibilities” recognized in the Kyoto 
Protocol, participation in global mitigation efforts among major developing country emitters will 
be delayed, causing marginal abatement costs to differ across regions. For a given climate 
stabilization scenario, to what extent does this affect worldwide abatement costs and appropriate 
policies in developed countries? 
Edmonds et al. (2008) explore these issues assuming Annex 1 countries agree to impose a 
harmonized emissions price starting in 2012, China joins the agreement at a later date, and other 
countries join whenever their per capita income reaches that of China at the time of China’s 
                                                 
5 The transition away from coal reflects not only the range of substitution possibilities in the power sector, but also 
the disproportionately large impact of emissions pricing on coal prices. A $10 price per ton of CO2 in the United 
States would increase 2007 coal prices to utilities by about 60 percent, wellhead natural gas prices by 9 percent, 
retail electricity and crude oil prices each by 7 percent, and gasoline prices by 3 percent (from Clarke et al. 2007, 
Table TS5, and www.eia.gov).  
6 As of 2009, proposed climate policies in the United States embody emission reduction targets approximately 
equivalent to about of 80 percent below 2000 levels by 2050. However, actual reductions in US CO2 emissions 
would be about 60 percent if provisions to exploit domestic and international emission offsets were fully exploited.  
7 US-specific models project emissions price ranges that are broadly consistent with those in Table 1. For example, 
analyses by Paltsev et al. (2007), EPA (2008), EIA (2008a) and CRA International (2008) project emissions prices 
of around $40-90 per ton of CO2 in 2025 for climate legislation that would reduce US CO2 emissions by about 20 
percent below 2000 levels by that date.  Resources for the Future  Aldy et al. 
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accession. In one scenario, they assume new entrants immediately face the prevailing Annex 1 
emissions price, while in another the emissions price for late entrants converges gradually over 
time to the Annex 1 price. The analysis accounts for emissions leakage, that is, the increase in 
emissions in non-participating countries due to the global relocation of energy-intensive firms, 
and increased use of fuels elsewhere as decreased demand in participating countries lowers 
world fuel prices. 
Under the 550 ppm CO2 target, even if China joins between 2020 and 2035, the 
implications for Annex 1 policies can be significant but are not that striking. Compared with the 
globally efficient policy, near-term Annex 1 emissions prices rise from between a few percent to 
100 percent under the different scenarios, and discounted global abatement costs are higher by 
10-70 percent. However, under the 450 ppm CO2 target, essentially all of the foregone earlier 
reductions in non-Annex 1 countries must be offset by additional early reduction in Annex 1 
countries (rather than more global abatement later in the century). This can imply dramatically 
higher near-term Annex 1 emissions prices, especially with longer delay and lower initial prices 
for late entrants. Under these scenarios, discounted global abatement costs are about 30-400 
percent higher than under globally efficient pricing, and near and medium term emissions prices 
can be an order of magnitude larger with China’s accession delayed till 2035. 
A further key point from Edmonds et al. (2008) is the potentially large shift in the global 
incidence of abatement costs, underlying the disincentives for early developing country 
participation. In the globally efficient policy, without any international transfer payments, 
developing countries bear about 70 percent of discounted abatement costs out to 2100, while 
they bear “only” 17-34 percent of global abatement costs when China’s accession occurs in 2035 
and new entrants face lower starting prices.   
Finally, insofar as possible pricing non-CO2 GHGs is also important. According to 
modeling results in de la Chesnaye and Weyant (2006), GDP costs are 20-50 percent larger when 
only CO2, as opposed to all, GHGs are priced, for the same overall limit on atmospheric CO2-
equivalent concentrations. This reflects opportunities for large-scale, low-cost options for non-
CO2 abatement in the first half of this century, though practical difficulties in pricing other 
GHGs are not factored into the models.   
2.1.4. Summary 
There is a large difference in the appropriate starting prices for GHG emissions, 
depending on whether the ultimate objective is to limit atmospheric CO2 concentrations to 450 or 
550 ppm—targets that are approximately consistent with keeping the eventual, mean projected Resources for the Future  Aldy et al. 
8 
warming above pre-industrial levels to 2.7 and 3.7
oC respectively (assuming non-CO2 GHGs are 
also priced). The 450 ppm target implies emissions prices should reach around $40-90 per ton of 
CO2 by 2025, while the 550 ppm target implies prices should rise to $3-25 by that date. Securing 
early and widespread participation in an international emissions control regime can also be 
critical for containing costs under the 450 ppm target, while under the 550 ppm target there is 
greater scope for offsetting the effect of delayed participation through greater emissions 
reductions in the latter half of the century. Given the considerable difference in GDP losses at 
stake between the two targets ($8-43 trillion in present value under cost-effective pricing out to 
2050 compared with $0.4-12 trillion), it is important to carefully assess what starting prices 
might be justified by avoiding climate change damages.   
2.2. Welfare-Maximizing Emissions Pricing 
2.2.1. Marginal Damage Estimates 
Estimates of the marginal damages from current emissions begin with a point estimate of 
total contemporaneous damages from warming, usually occurring around 2100. Total damage 
estimates from a number of studies are roughly in the same ballpark, for a given amount of 
warming. According to representative estimates in Figure 2, damages are in the range of about 1-
2 percent of world GDP for a warming of 2.5
oC above pre-industrial levels, though some 
estimates are close to zero or even negative (the prospects for negative costs diminishes with 
greater warming). For warming of about 4.0
oC, damage estimates are typically in the order of 2-4 
percent of world GDP. However, similarities in aggregate impacts mask huge inconsistencies 
across these studies, which reach strikingly different conclusions about the size of market and 
nonmarket damage categories and expected catastrophic risks (Figure 2).  
Very few studies attempt to value the damages from more extreme warming scenarios, 
given so little is known about the physical impacts of large temperature changes. Two exceptions 
are Nordhaus and Boyer (2000) and Stern (2007) who put expected total damages at 10.2 and 
11.3 percent of world GDP, for warming of 6.0
oC and 7.4
oC respectively, though these figures 
are necessarily based on extrapolations and subjective judgment. Again, there is little consistency 
across the estimates. In Nordhaus and Boyer (2000) catastrophic risks and market damages 
account for about 60 and 40 percent of total damages respectively, with non-market impacts 
roughly washing out (for example, there gains from leisure activities offset losses from the 
disruption of ecosystems and settlements). In contrast, non-market impacts account for about half 
of Stern’s overall damage estimate. Resources for the Future  Aldy et al. 
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Marginal damage estimates are based on assumptions about emissions/concentration 
relationships, climate adjustment and sensitivity, damages from climate change (inferred from a 
point estimate of total damages using functional form assumptions), and discount rates. Tol 
(2009) conducts several meta-analyses of marginal damage estimates, reporting median 
estimates of $4.1-20.2 per ton of CO2 (individual studies are not independent however, as they 
often drawing from the same sources and from each other). Although individual estimates are 
highly divergent, most are on the low side (see also Newbold et al. 2009). Especially striking is 
the difference between Stern (2007) at $85 and Nordhaus (2008) at $8 per ton of CO2—a 
difference largely dependent on discount rate assumptions (see below).8 
There is some consensus that marginal damages grow at around 2-3 percent a year in real 
terms (approximately the rate of growth in output potentially affected by climate change), or 
about half the rate as under cost-effective emissions pricing. Marginal damages rise with the 
extent of warming (suggesting a faster rate of increase), but an offsetting factor is that warming 
is a concave (logarithmic) function of atmospheric concentrations. Although CO2 concentrations 
ultimately reach 650 ppm in the twenty-second century in Nordhaus (2008)’s optimal policy, 
constraining CO2 concentrations to 550 ppm affects, only modestly, the emission price trajectory 
to 2050. Thus, optimal near and medium term emissions prices in Nordhaus (2008) are in the 
same ballpark with those for cost-effective stabilization of CO2 concentrations at 550 ppm, while 
starting prices in Stern (2008) are broadly consistent with cost-effective prices to stabilize CO2 
concentrations at 450 ppm, or lower.  
2.2.2. Controversies in Marginal Damage Assessment 
Differences in marginal damage estimates are largely explained by fundamentally 
different approaches to discounting rather than differences in total damages from a given amount 
of warming (Nordhaus 2007). However, the valuation of catastrophic and non-catastrophic 
damages is also highly contentious.   
                                                 
8 Some of the differences in marginal damage estimates reflect different assumptions about the year for which 
emissions are being priced, and about the extent of future warming. Most estimates of near-term Pigouvian taxes 
(i.e., marginal damages from the globally optimized emissions trajectory) are similar to marginal damage estimates 
at BAU emissions levels. One exception is Stern (2007) pp. 344 where marginal damages are considerably reduced 
when aggressive climate stabilization goals are achieved. Resources for the Future  Aldy et al. 
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Discounting. The descriptive approach to discounting argues that we can do no better 
than using observed market rates, typically assumed to be about 5 percent.9 According to this 
approach, market rates reveal individuals’ preferences, as best we understand them, about trade-
offs between early and later consumption within their lifecycle, as well as their ethical or 
intergenerational preferences. And they reflect the return earned by a broad range of private and 
public investments—the opportunity cost against which other, even intergenerational, 
investments ought to be measured. Proponents of the descriptive approach view discounting at 
market rates as essential for meaningful, consistent policy analysis and to avoid highly perverse 
implications in other policy contexts.  
In contrast the prescriptive approach argues that market rates cannot be used when 
looking across cohorts (rather than within individuals’ lifetimes). Instead, the discount rate (r) is 
decomposed as follows: r = ρ + x·η, where ρ is the pure rate of time preference, x is the growth 
rate in consumption, and η is the elasticity of marginal utility with respect to consumption. In 
Stern (2007), for example, ρ = 0.1, x = 1.3 and η = 1, implying r = 1.4. Choosing a value for ρ, 
the rate at which the utility of future generations is discounted just because they are in the future, 
is viewed as a strictly ethical judgment. And ethical neutrality, in this approach, essentially 
requires setting the pure rate of time preference equal to zero. Discriminating against people just 
because they are in the future is viewed as being akin to discriminating against people in the 
present generation just because they live in different countries (Heal 2009). There is also 
controversy over the appropriate value for η, which is almost as important as ρ. For example, 
Dasgupta (2006) argues for using a value of 2 to 4 on normative grounds, while Atkinson and 
Brandolini (2007) suggest a value below unity is plausible, based on observed government 
behavior.10  
                                                 
9 There are many market rates, from the long-term pre-tax real return to equities (about 7 percent) to the after-tax 
return to government bonds (about 2 percent). Converting all values into their consumption equivalents, and 
discounting at the consumption rate of interest, narrows the possible range of choice (e.g., Lind 1982). In fact 
McGratten and Prescott (2003) suggest that the divergence in effective rates of return is actually small, with an 
average real debt return during peacetime over the last century of almost 4 percent and the average equity return 
somewhat under 5 percent.   
10 Besides ethical arguments, Sterner and Persson (2008) argue for discounting the non-market impacts of climate 
change (e.g., ecosystem loss) at below market rates. This is because the value of non-market goods (which are 
essentially fixed in supply) rises over time relative to the value of market goods (for which supply increases along 
with demand), assuming market and non-market goods are imperfect substitutes for one another.    Resources for the Future  Aldy et al. 
11 
Catastrophic Risks. Although Nordhaus and Boyer (2000) and Stern (2007) include 
catastrophic risks in their damage assessments, the numbers are best viewed as highly 
speculative placeholders. Nordhaus and Boyer (2000) put the annual willingness to pay to avoid 
catastrophic risks at 1.0 and 6.9 percent of world GDP, for warming levels of 2.5 and 6.0
oC 
respectively, based on subjective probabilities (from an expert elicitation survey) for these 
warming levels permanently wiping out about a third of world GDP. In his central case, Stern 
(2007) assumes the chance of catastrophic climate change is zero up to a warming of about 5
oC, 
beyond which the annualized risk of regional GDP losses of 5-20 percent rises by about 10 
percent for each additional 1
oC of warming.  
Weitzman (2009a) takes a radically different perspective. He shows that if the probability 
of increasingly catastrophic outcomes falls more slowly than marginal utility in those outcomes 
rises (with diminished consumption), then the certainty-equivalent marginal damage from 
current emissions becomes infinite. These conditions apply if the probability distribution for 
climate sensitivity is a fat-tailed t-distribution (i.e., approaches zero at a less than exponential 
rate) and utility is a power function of consumption. Although marginal utility is probably not 
unbounded, Weitzman shows that with probabilities of a 20
oC temperature change inferred from 
IPCC (2007), and assuming this temperature change would lower world consumption to 1 
percent of its current level, expected catastrophic damages could easily dwarf non-catastrophic 
damages (even with these impacts delayed a century or more and discounted at market rates).11 
There are several responses to the Weitzman critique. One is that, most likely, the 
probability distribution for climate sensitivity may have thin rather than fat tails. If the 
distribution is thin-tailed, Newbold and Daigneault (2008) and Pindyck (2008) find that damage 
risks from extreme global warming are typically under 3 percent of consumption (rather than 
infinitely large).  
Second, setting a modest emissions price now does not preclude the possibility of a mid-
course correction, involving a rapid phase-down in global emissions, should future learning 
reveal we are on a catastrophic trajectory (e.g., Yohe and Tol 2009). This argument assumes 
                                                 
11 The IPCC report provides probability distributions from 22 scientific studies. Combining these distributions, 
Weitzman (2009a) suggests that there is a 5 percent and 1 percent probability that eventual warming from a 
doubling of CO2 equivalent concentrations will exceed 4.5°C and 7.0°C respectively. However, making an 
(extremely crude) adjustment for the possibility of feedback effects he infers a distribution where the probability of 
eventual temperature change exceeding 10°C and 20°C is 5 percent and 1 percent respectively. Resources for the Future  Aldy et al. 
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policymakers can avoid the catastrophe—it breaks down if this would require reversing previous 
atmospheric accumulations because an abrupt climate threshold has been crossed.  
Finally, a costly, rapid stabilization of GHG concentrations is a highly inefficient way to 
address the very small probability of extreme outcomes, if a portfolio of last-resort technologies 
could be successfully developed and deployed, if needed, to head off the catastrophe. These 
include “air capture” technologies for atmospheric GHG removal and “geo-engineering” 
technologies for modifying global climate.12 Moreover, these R&D efforts can be led by one or 
several countries, avoiding the challenges endemic in organizing a rapid emissions phasedown 
among a large number of emitting countries with widely differing interests. Nonetheless, public 
R&D into last-resort technologies (virtually non-existent at present) is highly contentious. One 
objection is that advancing last-resort technologies could undermine support for emissions 
mitigation efforts. Another is that geo-engineering (though not air capture) could have extreme 
downside risks (e.g., from overcooling the planet or radically altering precipitation patterns) that 
may be difficult to evaluate prior to widespread deployment. Whether effective institutions could 
be developed to prevent unilateral deployment of climate modification technologies prior to 
rigorous assessment of their risks is also unclear (e.g., Barret 2008, Victor 2008). 
In short, the implications of extreme catastrophic risks for emissions pricing are highly 
controversial. So long as there is some positive likelihood, no matter how small, that the climate 
sensitivity function is fat-tailed then catastrophic risks can still swamp non-catastrophic impacts. 
Mid-course policy corrections may come too late to prevent a catastrophe, given that it may take 
several decades for the full warming impacts of previous atmospheric accumulations to be 
realized. And the future viability of last-resort technologies is highly uncertain at present. All of 
these issues—the nature and extent of damages from extreme warming, the feasibility of future, 
mid-course policy corrections, and the efficient balance between mitigation and investment in 
last-resort technologies—are badly in need of economic analysis. 
Non-Catastrophic Impacts. Although on a different scale than catastrophic risks, 
controversies abound in the valuation of non-catastrophic damages. These include agricultural 
impacts, costs of increased storm intensity and protecting against rising sea levels, health impacts 
                                                 
12 Besides rapid re-forestation programs, air capture might involve bringing air into contact with a sorbent material 
that binds chemically with CO2 and extraction of the CO2 from the sorbent for underground, or other, disposal. Geo-
engineering technologies include, for example, deflection of incoming solar radiation through shooting particles into 
the stratosphere or blowing oceanic water vapor to increase the cover of reflective clouds.  Resources for the Future  Aldy et al. 
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from heatwaves and the possible spread of vector-borne disease, loss of ecosystems, and so on. 
Box 1 provides a very brief summary of attempts to value these damage categories (see Eber and 
Krupnick 2009 for a more detailed discussion). However, due to the rapid outdating of prior 
research, daunting methodological challenges, and the small number of economists working on 
aggregate damage assessment, the valuation literature remains highly inconsistent and poorly 
developed, as a few examples illustrate (Hannemann 2008).   
Damage assessments (like those in Figure 2) assume losses in consumer and producer 
surplus in agricultural markets are equivalent to anything from a net gain of about 0.1 percent to 
a net loss of 0.2 of world GDP for warming of about 2.5
oC occurring in 2100. However more 
recent, country-specific evidence suggests that output losses could be a lot larger than those 
assumed in the damage assessments to infer welfare costs to agriculture. For example, Cline 
(2007) suggests total losses of agricultural output in developing countries in the order of 30 
percent, while Guiteras (2008) estimates agricultural losses of 30-40 percent for India. Even for 
the United States, Schlenker et al. (2005) suggest that the output of individual crops could fall by 
up to 70 percent by 2100. Similarly, recent evidence on ice melting suggests that sea level rises 
over the next century may be more extreme than the 25-60 cm and assumed in most previous 
damage assessments (Box 1). And estimated ecosystem losses of about 0.1-0.2 percent of world 
GDP seem inconsistent with Fischlin et al. (2007)’s projection that 20-30 percent of the world’s 
species (an enormous amount of natural capital) faces some (though possibly slight) extinction 
risk.  
More generally, scientific models cannot reliably predict local changes in average 
temperature, temperature variability, and precipitation, all of which are critical to crop yields. 
The baseline for impact assessment decades from now is highly sensitive to assumptions about 
regional development (including the ability to adapt to climate change), future technological 
change (e.g., into climate- and flood-resistant crops), and other policies (e.g., attempts to 
eradicate malaria or integrate global food markets). Controversies surround the valuing of 
nonmarket effects (e.g., the value of mortality in poor countries, how much people in wealthy 
countries value ecosystem preservation in poor countries). There is scant evidence on additional 
risks, such as extreme local climate change (e.g., from shifting monsoons and deserts) and 
broader health effects (e.g., malnutrition from food shortages, the net effects of milder winters 
and hotter summers, and diarrhea if droughts reduce safe drinking water supplies). Most of the 
impact assessment literature is based on extrapolations from US studies—country-specific 
studies that account for local factors (e.g. ability to adapt farm practices to changing climate) 
have only recently begun to emerge. Finally, worldwide results mask huge disparities in regional Resources for the Future  Aldy et al. 
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burdens, and there is disagreement on how to aggregate impacts across regions with very 
different per-capita income.13 
 2.2.3. Further Issues Posed by Uncertainty. 
Finally, we touch on some additional complications for emissions pricing posed by 
uncertain discount rates, risk aversion, and irreversibility.  
In damage valuation, the time path of future discount rates is usually taken as given. 
However, the discount factor applied to damages is a convex function of the future discount rate, 
so discount rate uncertainty (for a given expected value) increases the certainty-equivalent 
discount factor (Weitzman 1998). Newell and Pizer (2003) estimated that discount rate 
uncertainty (inferred from US historical evidence) almost doubles estimates of marginal 
emissions damages.  
Leaving aside extreme risks, should marginal damage estimates include a risk premium? 
This would be appropriate if the marginal utility of consumption, net of climate damages, were 
larger in high-damage outcomes, in which case a mean-preserving increase in the spread of 
possible damages outcomes would increase expected disutility. However, if gross consumption is 
greater in high-damage scenarios (for example, because rapid productivity growth leads to both 
high consumption and high emission rates), then the marginal utility of consumption net of 
damages is lower, and possibly even lower than marginal utility in low-damage states. 
Simulations by Nordhaus (2008), Ch. 7, suggest this might in fact be the case, implying the risk 
premium is actually negative, though empirically small. On the other hand, we do not know what 
the probability distribution over damage outcomes is. If policymakers are averse to such 
ambiguity this may, under certain conditions, imply a higher near term price on emissions, 
though how much higher is difficult to quantify (Lange and Treich 2009).  
Returning to the issue of irreversibility and future learning, is there is an option value 
(which should be reflected in the emissions price) gained from delaying atmospheric GHG 
accumulations until more is known about how much damage they will cause? Option values arise 
if such delay increases the potential future welfare gains from responding to new information 
about damage risk (Pindyck 2007). If damages are linear in GHG concentrations, changes in the 
                                                 
13 Most studies aggregate regional impacts using weights equal to the region’s share in world GDP or world 
population. More generally, use of distributional weights can increase total damage estimates up to about 300 
percent (e.g., Pearce 2005). Resources for the Future  Aldy et al. 
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inherited concentration level do not affect marginal damages from additional, future 
accumulations. In this case, the welfare effects of policy interventions at different time periods 
are de-coupled (at least from the damage side), and there is no option value. If instead, damages 
are convex in atmospheric GHG accumulations the prospect of future learning reduces the 
optimal near-term abatement level, to the extent that the damages from near-term emissions can 
be lowered through greater abatement in future, high-damage scenarios. Moreover, to the extent 
that current abatement involves (non-recoverable) sunk investments in emissions-saving 
technologies, there is another source of option value, from delaying long-lived emissions-saving 
investments until more is known about the benefits of emissions reductions (Kolstad 1996a). For 
these reasons, theoretical analyses suggest that the prospect of future learning justifies less near-
term abatement (Kolstad 1996b, Fisher and Narain 2003, Pindyck 2007). However, as already 
noted, the critical exception to this is when there is a possibility of crossing a catastrophic 
threshold in atmospheric concentrations prior to future learning, which is essentially non-
reversible given the non-negativity constraint on future emissions. 
2.2.4. Summary 
Most estimates of near-term marginal damages are in the order of $5-$25 per ton of CO2. 
This range is in the same ballpark as near-term emissions prices consistent with least-cost 
stabilization of atmospheric CO2 concentrations at 550 ppm. These prices represent a lower 
bound on appropriate policy stringency. Much higher prices (that are consistent with 450 ppm, or 
even more stringent, CO2 stabilization targets) can be implied by low discount rates and, 
possibly, extreme catastrophic risks (depending on the shape of the climate sensitivity 
distribution). Thus, whether moderate or aggressive emissions pricing is currently warranted 
largely hinges on one’s view of discounting, whether radical mid-course corrections in response 
to future learning about catastrophes are feasible, and the prospects for development of last-
resort technologies.   
3. Policy Design 
3.1. Choice and Design of Domestic Emissions Control Instruments 
Debate over the choice of instrument for a nationwide carbon control program is no 
longer about the superiority of market-based approaches over traditional forms of regulation (like Resources for the Future  Aldy et al. 
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technology mandates) but rather between the two market-based alternatives, emissions taxes and 
cap-and-trade systems.14 In a world where the emissions externality is the only market distortion, 
and there is no uncertainty, either instrument could achieve the first-best outcome, if the 
emissions cap at each date equals the emissions that would result under the Pigouvian tax. 
Whether allowances are auctioned or given away for free has distributional consequences but 
does not affect efficiency in this setting, so long as firm behavior does not influence their future 
allowance allocations. If firms were free to bank and borrow emissions allowances, the policies 
would still be equivalent, if the permit trading ratios across different time periods were 
equivalent to the ratio of Pigouvian emissions taxes at those dates (Kling and Rubin 1997).  
The equivalence between the two instruments potentially breaks down in the presence of 
pre-existing tax distortions, when distributional impacts are a concern, and when there is 
uncertainty. Despite these complications, to a large extent permit systems can be designed to 
mimic the effect of a tax, and vice versa, and therefore the choice of instrument per se is less 
important than whether the chosen instrument is well designed (Goulder 2009). Aside from 
policy stringency, key design features relate to the point and scope of regulation, the allocation 
of policy rents, and possible provisions to limit price volatility.  
3.1.1. Point of Regulation 
Either a CO2 tax or cap-and-trade system can be imposed upstream where fuels enter the 
economy (the minemouth for coal or wellhead for oil and natural gas) according to a fuel’s 
carbon content or, as in the European trading program, to downstream emitters at the point where 
fuels are combusted. Upstream systems would require monitoring some 2,000-3,000 entities in 
the United Sates or European Union, while downstream systems would apply to 10,000 or more 
power plants and large industrial smokestacks (Hall 2007).15 For a given total emissions 
                                                 
14 Market-based instruments equalize marginal abatement costs across all abatement opportunities within the firm, 
across heterogeneous firms, across production sectors, and across households and firms, by establishing an 
economy-wide emissions price (Dales 1968, Kneese and Bower 1968, Baumol and Oates 1971, Montgomery 1972). 
In contrast, for example, a requirement that all electric utilities generate a fraction of their power from renewables 
will not achieve any of these efficiency conditions. Some opportunities at the firm level (e.g., substituting natural 
gas and nuclear power for coal), are not exploited; marginal costs will differ across heterogeneous power companies; 
household electricity prices will not reflect the cost of the remaining (unpriced) emissions; and abatement 
opportunities outside of the power sector are unexploited. For a broad reviews of the literature on environmental 
policy instrument choice see Hepburn (2006) and Goulder and Parry (2008). 
15 If introduced at the same points in the economy, CO2 taxes and cap-and-trade systems are likely to have very 
similar administrative costs. Under cap-and-trade, costs also include those from administering trading markets, as 
well as the transactions costs of the trades themselves, though these are relatively small (Stavins 1995). Resources for the Future  Aldy et al. 
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reduction, the estimated economic costs of downstream programs out to 2030 are not 
dramatically larger than those for comprehensive upstream systems—about 20 percent larger 
according to Goulder (2009)—even though downstream programs cover only about half of total 
US and EU CO2 emissions. This is because the huge bulk of low-cost abatement opportunities 
are (initially) in the power sector. Moreover, the infeasibility of monitoring emissions from 
vehicles, home heating fuels, and small-scale industrial boilers in a downstream system can be 
largely addressed through supplementary midstream measures targeted at refined transportation 
and heating fuels, which further narrows the cost discrepancy between upstream and downstream 
systems.  
There are a couple of other notable differences between the two systems. One is that 
upstream programs must be combined with a crediting system to encourage development and 
adoption of carbon capture and storage technologies at coal plants and industrial sources. (The 
tax credit should equal the amount of carbon sequestered, as measured by continuous emission 
monitoring systems, times the emissions price). The other is that, at least for the United States 
where many states retain cost-of-service regulation, the opportunity cost of freely allocated 
emissions allowances to electric utilities in a downstream system may not be passed forward into 
higher generation prices. As a result, incentives for electricity conservation could be a lot 
weaker, resulting in a significant loss of cost-effectiveness, compared with upstream programs or 
downstream programs with full allowance auctioning (Burtraw et al. 2001).  
3.1.2. Scope of Regulation 
Domestic programs that fail to cover embodied carbon in products imported from 
countries with sub-optimal or no emissions controls may cause significant emissions leakage. 
The problem is most relevant for downstream, energy-intensive firms competing in global 
markets (e.g., chemicals and plastics, primary metals, petroleum refining), where reduced 
production at home may be largely offset by increased production in other countries with higher 
emissions intensity than in the United States. According to some models, as much as 15–25 
percent of economy-wide US CO2 reductions could be offset by extra emissions elsewhere, 
although the majority of the leakage stems from changes in global fuel prices rather than re-
location of footloose capital (Gupta et al. 2007, Ho et al. 2008, Babiker and Rutherford 2005, 
Fischer and Fox 2007, 2009). Possible policy responses to the latter source of leakage include 
imposing taxes, or permit requirements, according to embodied carbon in product imports (and 
symmetrical rebates for exporters) or to subsidize the output of leakage-prone industries (e.g., Resources for the Future  Aldy et al. 
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through output-based allocations of free emissions allowances). However, all these approaches 
may run afoul of international trade obligations.   
Certain non-CO2 GHGs are easily monitored (e.g., vented methane from underground 
coalmines, fluorinated gases used in refrigerants and air conditioners) and could be directly 
integrated into a CO2 mitigation program through taxes, or permit trading ratios, reflecting their 
relative lifetime warming potential. Other gases are far more difficult to monitor, and are better 
incorporated, insofar as possible, through offset provisions, where the onus falls on the 
individual entity to demonstrate valid reductions relative to a credible baseline. For example, 
methane from landfills and livestock waste might be collected, using an impermeable cover, and 
flared or used in onsite power generation, while nitrous oxide might be reduced through changes 
in tilling and fertilizer use (e.g., Shih et al. 2006, Hall 2007).  
Finally, CO2 abatement through forest carbon sequestration (e.g., from reducing 
deforestation, reforesting abandoned cropland and harvested timberland, modifying harvest 
practices to reduce soil disturbance) appears to be relatively cost effective. According to Stavins 
and Richards (2005), as much as 30 percent of US fossil fuel CO2 emissions might be 
sequestered at a cost of up to about $20 per ton of CO2. Coupling a domestic mitigation program 
with offset provisions for forest carbon sequestration will require measuring regional forest 
inventories to establish baselines, monitoring changes in forest use (through remote sensing and 
ground-level sampling) relative to the baseline, and inferring the emissions implications of these 
changes based on sampling of local tree species and age. However, even if these monitoring 
challenges can be overcome, further problems remain. One is that, without an international 
program covering major forested countries, domestic reductions can be offset through emissions 
leakage via changes in world timber prices (Murray et al. 2002 estimate the international leakage 
rate could be anywhere from less than 10 percent to over 90 percent depending on the type of 
activity and location in the United States). Another is that sequestered carbon in trees is not 
necessarily permanent if trees are later cut down, decay or burn, requiring assignment of liability 
to either the offset buyer or seller for the lost carbon.  
3.1.3. Allocation of Policy Rents 
In their traditional form, emissions taxes raise revenues for the government, while cap-
and-trade systems create rents for firms receiving free allowance allocations. However, through 
allowance auctions, cap-and-trade systems can generate comparable revenues to a tax, while 
rents can be provided under a tax through infra-marginal exemptions for emissions or carbon 
content. Under either instrument, the fraction of policy rents accruing to the government rather Resources for the Future  Aldy et al. 
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than private firms, and how revenues are used, are extremely important for efficiency and 
distributional incidence. 
Fiscal Linkages. The implications for emissions control policies of pre-existing tax 
distortions in factor markets have received considerable attention in the broader environmental 
economics literature (e.g., Bovenberg and Goulder 2002), though these distortions are typically 
not integrated into energy-climate models. This raises two issues: to what extent is there a cost 
saving from policies that raise revenues and use them to offset distortionary taxes like income 
and payroll taxes, and to what extent do models that ignore prior tax distortions produce 
inaccurate estimates of policy costs? 
The efficiency gain from recycling revenues in other tax reductions (relative to returning 
them lump sum or leaving policy rents in the private sector) is simply the amount of revenue 
raised times the marginal excess burden of taxation. Although there is uncertainty over 
behavioral responses in factor markets, a typical assumption is that the marginal excess burden 
of income taxes (with revenue returned lump sum) is around $0.25 for the United States, or 
perhaps as high as $0.40 if distortions in the pattern of spending created by tax preferences (e.g., 
for employer medical insurance or homeownership) are taken into account. For modest carbon 
policies, the efficiency gain from revenue recycling can be large relative to the direct efficiency 
cost of the policy, or Harberger triangle under the marginal abatement cost schedule. For 
example, if a $20 tax on US CO2 emissions (currently about 6 billion tons) reduces annual 
emissions by 10 percent, the Harberger triangle is $6 billion, while the revenue-recycling benefit 
is roughly $30-40 billion per year.   
However, this does not necessarily mean that revenue-neutral CO2 taxes, or auctioned 
allowance systems, produce a “double dividend” by reducing the costs of the broader tax system, 
in addition to slowing climate change. There is a counteracting, “tax-interaction” effect (e.g., 
Goulder 1995). Specifically, the (policy-induced) increase in energy prices drives up the general 
price level, which reduces real factor returns, and thereby (slightly) reduces factor supply and 
efficiency. Most analytical and numerical analyses of environmental tax shifts find that the tax-
interaction effect exceeds the revenue-recycling effect, implying no double dividend, and that 
abatement costs are actually higher due the presence of pre-existing tax distortions. A rough rule 
of thumb from these models is that the costs of revenue-neutral emissions taxes are about 15 
percent greater, due to interactions with prior tax distortions, implying the optimal tax is 15 
percent lower than the Pigouvian tax (e.g., Bovenberg and Goulder 2002). However, the cost 
increase is far more substantial for policies that do not exploit the revenue recycling effect (i.e., 
cap-and-trade with free allowance allocation or CO2 taxes with revenues not used to increase Resources for the Future  Aldy et al. 
20 
economic efficiency). According to formulas derived in Goulder et al. (1999), the increase 
exceeds 100 percent when the emissions reduction is below 30 percent.16  
More generally, there are many ways that carbon policy revenues might be used, such as 
funding technology programs, climate adaptation projects, deficit reduction, energy efficiency 
programs, rebates to electricity consumers, and any number of complex adjustments to the tax 
system, though the efficiency implications of these recycling options are often not well 
understood. Although in recent years there has been more interest in permit auctions, in some 
cases it is unclear how the revenues will be spent.17 Unless legislation accompanying carbon 
policies specifies offsetting reductions in other distortionary taxes, there is ambiguity in to what 
extent this shift implies a reduction in the overall costs of carbon policies.  
Distributional Considerations. The distributional impacts of emissions control policies 
are potentially important for both equity and feasibility. 
On equity grounds the difference between (revenue-neutral) CO2 taxes/auctioned 
allowances, and allowance systems with free allocation to firms, can be quite striking. Under the 
latter policy, permit rents are reflected in higher firm equity values, and therefore (through 
dividend and capital gains income) ultimately accrue to shareholders, who are concentrated in 
upper income groups. Dinan and Rogers (2002) estimated that, for a 15 percent reduction in CO2 
emissions, US households in the lowest-income quintile would be worse off on average by 
around $500 per year, while households in the top-income quintile reap a net gain of around 
$1,000 (i.e., increased stockholder wealth overcompensates this group for higher energy prices). 
                                                 
16 There are some caveats here. One is that the proportionate increase in abatement costs may be much smaller in 
other countries if tax wedges in factor markets are smaller than those in the United States, or if labor markets are 
dominated by institutional wage setting (e.g., Bosello et al. 2001). Another is that the tax-interaction effect is weaker 
if, due to regulated pricing and/or infra-marginal rents on coal technologies that bear some of the burden of 
emissions pricing, there is incomplete pass through of emissions prices into electricity prices (Bento and Jacobsen 
2007, Parry 2005). Finally, the revenue-recycling effect can dominate the tax-interaction effect when tax preferences 
cause significant distortions or when a large share of revenues are used to cut taxes on capital as opposed to labor 
(see Parry and Bento 2000 and Bovenberg and Goulder 1997 respectively).  
17 For example, in the first two phases of the European Union’s CO2 trading program (2005-2007 and 2008-2012), 
over 95 percent of the allowances were given away free to existing emissions sources. However, partly in response 
to the large windfall profits earned by power companies, the plan is to transition to full allowance auctions for that 
sector by 2020, with the decision on how to use revenues largely left to the member states (Sijm et al. 2006, CEC 
2008). In the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative in the United States, covering power sector CO2 emissions from 
ten Northeastern and Mid-Atlantic states, allowances are auctioned with revenues earmarked for energy efficiency 
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This inequitable outcome could be avoided under emissions taxes and auctioned allowance 
systems if revenues were recycled in income tax reductions (e.g., Metcalf 2009).  
As regards feasibility, compensation for adversely affected industries may be part of the 
political deal-making needed to first initiate, and progressively tighten, emissions controls (e.g., 
Ellerman 2005). Compensation, through free allowance allocation or tax relief, may be required 
for both formally regulated sectors and downstream sectors vulnerable to higher energy prices 
(e.g., energy-intensive firms competing in global markets). However, given the tension between 
providing industry compensation, and the fiscal and (household) equity reasons for raising 
revenue, it is important to know how much compensation is needed to keep firms whole. At least 
for a moderately scaled CO2 permit system, only about 15-20 percent of allowances are needed 
to compensate energy intensive industries for their loss of producer surplus, so the huge bulk of 
the allowances could still be auctioned (Bovenberg and Goulder 2001, Smith et al. 2002). 
Although there are reasons for phasing out compensation over time, firms may still be amenable 
to this if they receive excess compensation in the early years of the program (e.g., Stavins 
2007).18  
3.1.4. Price Volatility 
Another reason CO2 taxes and cap-and-trade systems may produce different outcomes 
stems from uncertainty over future abatement costs reflecting, for example, uncertainty over 
energy prices, technological advances, and substitutes for fossil fuels.  
Price Versus Quantity Instruments in their Pure Form. If the goal is welfare 
maximization, abatement cost uncertainty strongly favors emissions taxes over cap-and-trade 
systems in their pure form. This is most easily seen in a static setting where the marginal benefits 
from abatement are constant. In this case, a Pigouvian emissions tax automatically equates 
marginal benefits to marginal abatement costs, regardless of the position of the marginal 
abatement cost schedule.  In contrast, when emissions are capped to equate marginal benefits 
with expected marginal abatement costs, ex post abatement will either be too high or too low 
                                                 
18 One reason for phasing out allowance allocations is that they must initially be based on a firm’s historical 
emission rates (prior to program implementation), which may be viewed as increasingly unfair as firms grow or 
contract at different rates, or change their fuel mix, over time. However, any updating of baselines based on firm 
performance will likely introduce distortions in firm behavior (Rosendahl 2008). Free allowance allocation may also 
retard the exit of inefficient firms from an industry, if firms lose their rights to future allocations when they go out of 
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depending on whether the marginal abatement cost schedule is higher or lower than expected 
(Weitzman 1974, Roberts and Spence 1976, Yohe 1978). 
This basic result carries over to a dynamic context with a sequence of annual (Pigouvian) 
taxes or emissions caps, and where environmental damages depend on the accumulated 
atmospheric stock of emissions. Here, we have strong reasons to believe that the marginal 
benefits from global emissions reductions are essentially constant, as abatement in any one year 
has minimal impact on the atmospheric stock. In fact, with abatement cost uncertainty, 
simulation analyses suggest that discounted welfare gains under (globally-imposed) CO2 taxes 
might be several times those under (equivalently-scaled) permits (e.g., Pizer 2003, Hoel and 
Karp 2002). A qualification to this is that the welfare advantage of taxes is less pronounced if 
abatement cost shocks persist over time and the emissions cap can be adjusted in response to 
those shocks (e.g., Karp and Zhang 2005, Newell and Pizer 2003).  
Stabilizing Allowance Prices. Emissions price volatility under cap-and-trade systems can 
be contained by allowing firms to bank permits when permit prices (and marginal abatement 
costs) are low, and borrow permits from future periods when prevailing prices are high. In fact, if 
banking and borrowing were completely unlimited and costless, expected allowance prices 
would rise at the interest rate, and the system would be largely equivalent to that of an emissions 
tax growing at the interest rate. Alternatively, through establishing appropriate ratios for trading 
permits across time, the allowance price trajectory could mimic the growth in marginal emissions 
damages over time (e.g., Kling and Rubin 1997). 
In fact, most existing cap-and-trade systems (e.g., the federal SO2 and regional CO2 
programs in the United States and the European Union’s CO2 program) now incorporate banking 
and borrowing provisions, though in response to concerns about default risk, borrowing is 
penalized through unfavorable trading ratios and/or quantitative limits. Fell et al. (2008) estimate 
that banking and borrowing provisions contained in leading US federal climate proposals obtain 
about one quarter to one half of the cost savings from emissions taxes over equivalent cap-and-
trade systems without these provisions.  
An alternative approach is to limit price volatility through a “safety valve”, where the 
government sells additional permits at a fixed price to prevent allowance prices from rising 
above a ceiling price (e.g., Jacoby and Ellerman 2004). Expected welfare under this policy is 
maximized by essentially designing it to mimic a Pigouvian tax—that is, setting the safety valve 
price equal to marginal emissions damages and the emissions cap tight enough so the safety 
valve binds nearly all the time (Pizer 2003). Intermediate cases (with higher safety valve prices Resources for the Future  Aldy et al. 
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and/or less stringent caps) generate intermediate welfare gains between those of the pure tax and 
emissions quota. A further alternative is a collar which combines a price ceiling with a price 
floor. This approach encourages additional abatement when allowance prices are low (to offset 
reduced abatement when allowance prices are high) and avoids the potentially harmful impacts 
of the price ceiling only on incentives to invest in emissions-saving technologies. According to 
Fell et al. (2008) the annualized cost savings between emissions taxes and fixed emissions quotas 
in the United States would be about $4 billion for an emissions price of around $20 per ton of 
CO2, with safety valves and price collars yielding intermediate cost savings.  
One final twist in instrument choice is that the price flexibility afforded by a cap-and-
trade system with (unhindered) allowance borrowing and banking could actually be 
advantageous from a social welfare perspective, when there is learning about future damages and 
emissions taxes can only be adjusted at discrete intervals (Murray et al. 2009).19 Under the 
former policy, new information about damages will be immediately reflected in the time path of 
current and expected future allowance prices, as speculators anticipate an adjustment of future 
emissions targets in response to that information. In contrast, it may take some time before 
emissions taxes can be adjusted to reflect new information, leaving emissions prices sub-optimal 
during the period of policy stickiness.  
3.2 Promoting Technology Development and Diffusion 
Several studies have demonstrated the central role that the availability and cost of 
advanced energy technologies plays in determining the future costs of GHG emission targets 
(e.g., Clarke et al. 2006, Edmonds et al. 2000, Gillingham et al. 2008). For example, Clarke et al. 
(2006) found that if ambitious goals for technology development are achieved, this can reduce 
discounted global abatement costs by 50 percent or more. Establishing a price on CO2 emissions 
is the single most important policy for encouraging the innovation that might bring about 
advanced technology development. However, additional measures to promote applied R&D, 
more basic research, and technology deployment, may be justified to the extent they address 
market failures at different stages of the innovation process.   
                                                 
19 Uncertainty over the marginal benefit schedule, in the absence of learning, would not affect the choice between 
emissions taxes and cap-and-trade because, on average, cumulated emissions reductions, and hence expected 
environmental benefits, are the same under both instruments (e.g., Stavins 1996).  Resources for the Future  Aldy et al. 
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3.2.1. R&D Policy 
One market failure stems from the inability of private sector inventors or innovators to 
fully appropriate spillover benefits to other firms that might copy a new technology, imitate 
around the technology if it is under patent, or otherwise use knowledge about the technology to 
advance their own research programs (Jaffe et al. 2003). Numerous empirical studies suggest that 
technology spillovers cause the (marginal) social return to (commercial) R&D to be several 
times the (marginal) private return.20  
The appropriability problem implies that R&D incentives will be sub-optimal, even under 
Pigouvian emissions pricing. One response would simply be to set emissions prices at a level 
higher than warranted by externalities. However, this would generate efficiency losses from 
excessive short-term abatement, and would not differentiate incentives across technologies that 
might face very different market impediments. In fact, no single instrument—either emissions 
pricing or R&D incentives—can effectively correct both the emissions externality and the 
knowledge appropriability problem: using one instrument alone may involve considerably higher 
costs than employing two complementary instruments (Fischer and Newell 2008, Goulder and 
Schneider 1999). 
 Unfortunately, available literature provides limited guidance on the design of 
complementary R&D instruments. It is not clear which instrument among, for instance, research 
subsidies, strengthened patent rules, or technology prizes, is most efficient, as this depends on 
the magnitude of technology spillovers, the scope for monopoly pricing under patents, and 
asymmetric information between governments and firms about the expected benefits and costs of 
research (e.g., Wright 1983). And just how much applied R&D in the energy sector should be 
expanded is difficult to estimate, given uncertainty over the productivity of research and the risk 
                                                 
20 For example, Griliches (1992), Mansfield (1985), Jones and Williams (1998). Although there is a possibility of 
excessive competition for a given amount of innovation rent, analogous to the excessive competition for open-access 
resources, this problem is generally thought to be dominated by the imperfect appropriability effect (Griliches 1992). 
In fact, the problem of suboptimal innovation incentives may be especially severe for GHG-saving technologies, 
compared with commercial technologies. For example, skepticism over long-term commitments to emissions 
pricing, and the desirability of retaining policy discretion to respond to future scientific knowledge, undermines the 
durable and substantial incentives needed for encouraging GHG-saving technology investments with high upfront 
costs. Limited patent lifetimes may also discourage firms from launching R&D programs until a high enough 
emissions price is established (Gerlagh et al. 2008). 
Still, efficiency gains from correcting the R&D market failure appear to be smaller than those from correcting the 
CO2 emissions externality (Parry et al. 2003).  Resources for the Future  Aldy et al. 
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of crowding out socially valuable research elsewhere in the economy (e.g., Nordhaus 2002, 
Goulder and Schneider 1999).  
3.2.2. Basic Research 
Appropriability problems are most severe for more basic research, which is largely 
conducted by universities, other nonprofits, and federal labs, mostly through central government 
funding. While it is not practical to assess the efficient allocation of funding across individual 
programs, Newell (2008), pp. 32, suggests that a doubling of US federal climate research 
spending (currently about $4 billion a year) is likely warranted, based on plausible assumptions 
about the rate of return on such spending. To avoid crowding out, this should be phased in to 
allow a progressive expansion in supply of college graduates in engineering and science. 
3.2.3. Deployment Policy 
In principle there are several possibilities for market failures at the technology 
deployment stage. For example, through learning-by-doing early adopters of a new technology 
(e.g., a cellulosic ethanol plant or solar photovoltaic installations) may lower production costs for 
later adopters (e.g., van Bentham et al. 2008). But since the potential for these spillovers may 
vary greatly depending on industry structure, the maturity of the technology, etc. any case for 
early adoption subsidies needs to be considered on a case-by-case basis. 
Another possible market failure is consumer undervaluation of energy efficiency, which 
has been a key motivation for regulations governing auto fuel economy and household 
appliances. However, although there is an empirical literature suggesting that households 
discount savings from energy efficiency improvements at much higher rates than market rates, 
whether this is evidence of a market failure as opposed to hidden costs or borrowing constraints 
remains an unsettled issue (e.g., Gillingham et al. 2009). Other market imperfections might 
include asymmetric information between project developers and lenders, network effects in large 
integrated systems, and incomplete insurance markets for liability associated with specific 
technologies. However because solid empirical evidence is lacking, little can be said about the 
seriousness of all these market failure possibilities, and whether or not they might warrant 
additional policy interventions.  
3.3. International Policy Design 
Proposed architectures for international emissions control regimes can be loosely 
classified into those based on bottom-up versus top-down (i.e., internationally negotiated) 
approaches and cap-and-trade systems versus systems of emissions taxes (e.g., Aldy and Stavins Resources for the Future  Aldy et al. 
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2007). There is disagreement over which type of architecture is most desirable, and most likely 
to emerge in practice. In the bottom up approach, norms for participation might evolve from 
small groups of countries launching regional programs that progressively expand and integrate, 
or by explicit linking of domestic cap-and-trade programs (e.g., Carraro 2007, Jaffe and Stavins 
2008, Victor 2007). Alternatively, countries might regularly pledge emissions reductions with 
periodic reviews by a formal institution (e.g., Schelling 2007, Pizer 2007). Here we focus on top-
down approaches, given that advocates of rapid climate stabilization tend to favor internationally 
binding commitments.  
The most daunting challenge is designing an architecture that encourages participation 
among some three or four dozen of the world’s largest GHG emitters—the Kyoto framework 
failed to do this as non-Annex 1 countries, including China, Brazil, South Africa, Mexico and 
Indonesia, had no emissions control obligations, while the United States withdrew from the 
agreement.21 Broad participation is needed—at least over the longer term and possibly also the 
near term under a stringent climate stabilization target (see above)—to promote the cost-
effectiveness of any international agreement, and limit concerns about international 
competitiveness and emissions leakage. Participation of developing countries through the Clean 
Development Mechanism (CDM), as at present, does not reduce global emissions—it only 
lowers the cost to developed countries of meeting their emissions goals by allowing firms to 
purchase (lower cost) emissions reductions elsewhere on a project-by-project basis. Moreover, 
there is considerable concern that some CDM credits may not represent truly additional 
reductions, due the difficulty of establishing a baseline against which reductions can be 
measured, in which case the CDM serves to increase global emissions (e.g., Keeler and 
Thompson 2008, Rosendahl and Strand 2008).  
To be successful, each country must perceive an emissions control agreement as 
equitable in terms of sharing the burden of global mitigation costs. Usually this means that 
industrial countries bear a disproportionately greater cost burden due to their higher per capita 
                                                 
21 China’s CO2 emissions now exceed those for the United States, while India’s exceed those of Japan (EIA 2008b, 
Table A10). In fact, 50 non-Annex 1 countries now have per capita income greater than that of the poorest Annex 1 
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income and greater contribution to historical GHG accumulations.22 However, as noted above, 
under a globally cost-effective pricing agreement with no side-payments, developed countries 
may bear two-thirds or more of discounted global abatement costs over the next century. 
Negotiations are further hampered, under a Kyoto type of framework, by the need to agree on 
emissions quotas for every participating country, and to periodically re-negotiate these quotas, 
which can be contentious if economies expand at different rates during interim periods.  
Frankel (2009) offers a global cap-and-trade proposal that addresses equity through 
imposing no cost burden on developing countries in the early years, and subsequently a cost 
burden comparable to those previously borne by others at a similar stage of economic 
development. Global cost effectiveness is preserved, and emissions leakage avoided, by 
establishing a harmonized emissions price through immediately incorporating all countries into 
the global trading system, with low-income countries initially allocated emissions caps equal to 
their projected emissions. Effectively, the pattern of stringent and lax quota allocations among 
developed and developing countries creates a system of side payments from developed countries 
(who are net permit buyers) which compensates developing countries (who are net permit 
sellers) for the costs of their emissions reductions. Furthermore, negotiations are greatly 
simplified by the establishment of simple formulas that automatically start reducing developing 
country quotas once their per capita income, or per capita emissions, cross certain thresholds.  
A globally harmonized CO2 tax can be designed to essentially replicate this cap-and-trade 
system, so there appears to be little reason, in this regard, for preferring one instrument over the 
other. Instead of agreeing on a global emissions cap, and how it adjusts over time, countries 
would need to agree on a harmonized tax rate, and how this rate is increased over time. And 
instead of negotiating over rules relating quota allocations to the evolution of per capita income 
(or emissions) over time, countries would need to agree on rules for explicit side payments 
related to a country’s per capita income (or emissions).  
However, under either the cap-and-trade or tax-based approach, there is an obvious 
tension between compensating developing nations and policy stringency. For example, Jacoby et 
al. (2008) estimate that under a global policy that stabilizes CO2 concentrations at 
                                                 
22 There is some dispute over historical responsibilities, however. Although industrial countries are responsible for 
about 80 percent of previous fossil fuel emissions, when releases from land-use changes are taken into account 
Mueller et al. (2007) suggest that poor countries are responsible for 45 percent of the increase in atmospheric CO2 
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(approximately) 450 ppm, compensation for developing countries would entail (explicit or 
implicit) side payments by the United States of $200 billion in 2020 (or ten times current US 
development assistance), which calls into question the credibility of such compensation schemes. 
Even with less than full compensation, the international transfers are of unprecedented scale. A 
critical lesson here is to keep down compensation to the minimum amount needed to entice 
developing country participation. In this regard, granting these countries initial quota allocations 
equal to their BAU emissions is wasteful, as it provides roughly twice the compensation needed 
to cover abatement costs (in the absence of other distortions, excess compensation is the integral 
between the emissions price and the marginal abatement cost curve).  
As regards verification of policies, one potential problem with an emissions tax is that 
countries may undermine its effect through reductions in other energy taxes. In principle, 
countries might be pressured to adjust their emissions tax rate to offset changes in other energy 
tax provisions, based on periodic reviews of country tax systems, and progress on emissions 
reductions, by an independent agency like the International Monetary Fund. Measuring other 
energy tax provisions in terms of their equivalent tax (or subsidy) on CO2 would be contentious 
however, because of opaque systems of tax preferences for energy investments, the possible role 
of energy taxes in correcting other externalities like local pollution and road congestion, and the 
possibility of non-tax regulations that further penalize or subsidize energy (e.g., fuel economy 
standards, energy price regulations). On the other hand, most countries have established tax 
ministries that would be able to implement a new tax on (the carbon content of) fossil fuels. In 
contrast, many developing countries may lack the capacity to enforce permit requirements and 
property rights due to weak environmental agencies and judicial institutions.  
Finally, although not incorporated in most energy/climate models, the forest sector 
appears to offer some of the easiest and least expensive opportunities for cutting CO2 emissions. 
For example, under a 550 ppm CO2 stabilization target, Tavoni et al. (2007) estimate that forest 
sinks can contribute one-third of total abatement by 2050, and thereby decrease the required 
price on CO2 emissions by around 40 percent. This is mainly achieved through avoided 
deforestation in tropical forests, though it could be sustained in the second half of the century 
through aforestation and enhanced forest management. Emission credits for slowed deforestation 
were not permitted under the 1997 Kyoto framework, but since then analysts have become 
somewhat more optimistic about the feasibility of integrating deforestation into an international 
emissions control regime, despite the practical challenges noted above (e.g. DeFries et al. 2006). 
However, broad participation in any agreement among major tropical forest regions would be 
critical to avoid the risk of serious emissions leakage. Resources for the Future  Aldy et al. 
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3.4. Summary 
A revenue-neutral CO2 tax has multiple desirable properties from an efficiency 
standpoint. Although allowances can be auctioned, and emissions price volatility contained, why 
implement a more elaborate cap-and-trade system if its purpose is to largely mimic the 
advantages of a tax? A likely answer is that political factors appear to favor the latter instrument 
(e.g., Goulder 2009). Emissions taxes, at least in the United States, appear to be highly 
unpopular, while cap-and-trade systems are popular among environmental advocates given their 
focus on binding emissions targets and they also have active supporters in the financial sector, 
who see them as opportunities to make money. But whichever instrument is chosen, getting the 
design details right is critical for cost-effectiveness—especially broad coverage of emissions, 
raising and efficiently using revenues, and containing price variability.  
While most analysts agree that mitigation policies should be supplemented with 
additional policies to promote basic and applied research into emissions-saving technologies at 
government, university, and private institutions, the level of support and the specific instruments 
that should be employed are far less clear. And there is little consensus about the case for further 
policy intervention at the technology deployment stage—this depends on the specifics of the 
industries or processes involved and assumptions about consumer behavior that are in need of 
further study.  
At an international level, the choice between cap-and-trade and emissions taxes is also 
nuanced. Either system can be globally cost-effective and accommodate transfers to developing 
countries. And while cap-and-trade systems are immune to the possibility of offsetting changes 
in the broader energy tax system, they may face larger implementation obstacles in developing 
countries. The biggest problem in transitioning away from the CDM towards an integrated global 
emissions trading system is the possibility of a large gap between the compensation that might be 
demanded by developing countries in exchange for their participation and the amount of 
compensation that developed countries are willing to provide—a gap that could be especially 
large under rapid atmospheric stabilization targets. Finally, integration of carbon forest 
sequestration into international emissions control agreements is potentially important for 
containing the burden of mitigation costs. Resources for the Future  Aldy et al. 
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4. Research Priorities  
While a great deal has been learned about climate policy design over the last couple of 
decades, much economic analysis remains to be done.   
Energy/climate models provide some rough bounds on near-term emissions pricing 
trajectories, and associated GDP losses, implied by climate stabilization scenarios, and the range 
of uncertainty may narrow as more is learned about the costs of new technologies and behavioral 
responses to emissions pricing. Nonetheless, there are many research priorities in this area, such 
as trying to narrow disagreement over BAU emissions assumptions (e.g., through better 
population projections); improving the representation of endogenous technological change, prior 
policy distortions, and possible market power in world oil and natural gas markets; quantifying 
the benefits of major technological breakthroughs to guide R&D efforts; and further exploring 
the cost and distributional implications of deviations from globally efficient emissions pricing. 
Some of the biggest challenges facing climate economists are to develop, and apply, 
methodologies for valuing the wide array of market and non-market impacts across different 
regions, time periods, and scenarios for climate change (ecological, health, and extreme sea level 
impacts in particular, are poorly understood). However, in terms of shedding more light on 
whether there is a solid economic basis for aggressive, as opposed to more moderate, near-term 
emissions pricing, the most critical issues in need of study appear to be the nature and magnitude 
of damage risks from extreme warming scenarios and the extent to which the possibility of 
future, mid-course corrections, and deployment of last-resort technologies, in response to future 
learning, lowers the near-term emissions price. More research on discount rates might also be 
valuable, especially in trying to reconcile different approaches (e.g., Beckerman and Hepburn, 
2007).  
On the design of domestic mitigation schemes, one topic badly in need of study, given 
the potentially large revenues from carbon policies, is the efficiency and distributional 
implications of the diverse array of options for revenue use. Additional research priorities 
include the design of practical, and cost-effective, provisions to address international emissions 
leakage and incorporate incentives for abatement of non-CO2 GHGs and forest carbon 
sequestration.  
As regards complementary technology policy, research is needed on both the appropriate 
level, and the relative efficiency, of alternative instruments to encourage applied R&D, as well as 
the amount and composition of basic energy R&D. Empirical research is also needed to ascertain Resources for the Future  Aldy et al. 
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whether or not there are additional market failures that justify further policy intervention at the 
technology deployment stage. Even if the empirical basis for such market failures is weak, 
research is still needed on the interactions, and possible redundancies, between all kinds of 
increasingly prevalent climate and energy-related regulatory interventions. For example, in the 
transportation sector this would include interactions between carbon policies, fuel taxes, fuel 
economy standards, low-carbon fuel standards, hybrid vehicle purchase subsidies, and subsidies 
and mandates for renewable fuels. In the power sector it would include interactions with 
regulations governing the efficiency of buildings, appliances, and lighting and inducements for 
renewable and other low-carbon fuels.   
Finally, a critical issue at an international level is the design of rules for accession and 
graduated responsibilities for developing countries that are widely perceived as being fair. At the 
same time, agreements should minimize deviations from cost-effective emissions pricing as well 
as minimizing the risks of excessive transfers to developing countries.  
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Tables and Figures 
 
 
Box 1. Valuation of Noncatastrophic Climate Damages  
(for Warming of 2.5
oC or Thereabouts Occurring Around 2100) 
 
 
Agriculture. Estimates of consumer and producer surplus losses in agricultural markets from predicted 
changes in regional temperature and precipitation use evidence on crop/climate sensitivity from 
laboratory experiments and on regressions of land values or farm performance on climate variables (e.g., 
Adams et al. 1990, Reilly et al. 2001, Mendelsohn et al. 1994, 2001). Laboratory studies can control for 
confounding factors like soil quality and the fertilizing effect of higher CO2 concentrations, while 
regression analyses account for farm level adaptation (e.g., changes in crop variety and 
planting/harvesting dates). Worldwide agricultural impacts have been built up using extrapolations from 
US studies, adjusting for differences in local agricultural composition and climate, and, more recently, 
country-specific evidence that captures local factors like adaptive capability. Studies show a pattern of 
gains in high latitude and temperate regions (like Russia), where current temperatures are below optimum 
levels for crop growth, counteracting damages in tropical regions, where current temperatures are already 
higher than optimal. 
Sea Level. The annualized costs of future global sea level rises, due to thermal expansion and melting of 
sea ice, have been estimated using projections of which coastal regions will be protected, engineering data 
on the costs of dikes, sea walls, beach replenishment, etc., and estimated losses from abandoned or 
degraded property in unprotected areas. Some studies assume efficient behavior by local policymakers in 
their choice of which areas to protect and at what time, while others assume all currently developed areas 
will be protected (Yohe 2000). Nordhaus (2008) also includes an estimate of property losses from 
increased storm intensity due to greater wind speed and waves coming off a higher water level. Whether 
storm frequency will increase with more humid air is uncertain (IPCC 2007). Worldwide sea level 
impacts have been extrapolated from US evidence, adjusting for the fraction of local land area in close 
proximity to the coast, though recently there have been some local studies that account for the slope and 
elevation of coastal land and prospective population growth (e.g., Ng and Mendelsohn 2005 on 
Singapore). Overall, estimates are relatively modest, for example they amount to 0.32 of world GDP in 
Nordhaus (2008). 
Some scientists project that sea levels could increase by several meters by 2100 (Hansen 2007) 
rather than the 25-60 cm projected by IPCC (2007). This would have major impacts on New York, 
Boston, Miami, London, Tokyo, Bangladesh, the whole of the Netherlands, and so on, and would 
completely inundate several small island states. Based on extrapolations from sea level protection costs in 
Holland, the global costs of this more extreme sea level rise may be at least an order of magnitude or 
more greater than for a moderate sea level rise, especially if coastal protection cannot be constructed 
expeditiously (Nicholls et al. 2008, Olsthoorn et al. 2008). Another possibility is that warming may cause 
changes in ocean circulation patterns. However, IPCC (2007) projects that warming from climate change 
will dominate any cooling effect on Europe from a weaker Gulf Stream. 
Other market sectors. Studies suggest other market impacts are relatively minor. With most forests along 
the increasing part of the inverted-U relation between forest productivity and temperature, Sohngen et al. 
(2001) find positive overall impacts from warming on global timber markets. Most studies find a net loss Resources for the Future  Aldy et al. 
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for the energy sector, as increased costs for space cooling dominate savings in space heating (e.g., 
Mendelsohn and Neumann 1999). Impacts on water availability also tend to be negative, as increased 
evaporation reduces freshwater supplies, and the value of these losses is compounded with greater 
demand for irrigation (Mendelsohn and Williams 2007). 
Health. There have been some attempts to quantify future health damages. For example, using statistical 
evidence on climate and disease, Nordhaus and Boyer (2000) put health risks from the possible spread of 
vector-borne diseases like malaria at 0.10 percent of world GDP. Broader health risks are even more 
speculative. According to McMichael et al. (2004), there were 166,000 excess deaths worldwide in 2000 
from climate change to date. Of these, “only” 16 percent were from malaria, 46 percent reflected greater 
malnutrition due to food shortages, another 28 percent more diarrhea cases as droughts reduce safe 
drinking water supplies and concentrate contaminants, while 7 percent were from temperature extremes 
(most in Southeast Asia). However, malnutrition projections are extremely sensitive to assumptions about 
whether, over the next century, currently vulnerable regions develop, become more integrated into global 
food markets, and are able to adopt hardier crops. And increased incidence of water-borne illness might 
be counteracted by future development and adoption of water purification systems. Monetizing mortality 
effects is also contentious as there are very few direct estimates of the value of a statistical life for poor 
countries.  
Ecosystems. All aspects of future climate change are potential stressors to natural systems. Combining 
projections of ecosystems at risk from climate change with evidence on the medicinal value of plants and 
willingness to pay for species and habitat preservation, Fankhauser (1995) and Tol (1995) put the value of 
ecosystem loss in 2100 at 0.21 and 0.13 percent of world GDP respectively. Nordhaus and Boyer (2000) 
put the combined risks to natural ecosystems and climate-sensitive human settlements at 0.17 percent of 
world GDP in 2100, assuming the capital value of vulnerable systems is 5−25 percent of regional output, 
and an annual willingness to pay equal to 1 percent of capital value. These estimates are highly 
speculative, given that very little is known about ecological impacts and how people value large scale (as 
opposed to marginal) ecosystem loss.  
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CCSP
a MERGE MiniCAM IGSM MERGE MiniCAM IGSM MERGE MiniCAM IGSM
Global CO2 emissions, relative to 2000
Reference 1.27 1.46 1.70 1.59 1.98 2.59 3.42 3.21 3.45
450 CO2 stabilization 0.92 0.97 0.86 0.53 0.57 0.64 0.24 0.39 0.55
550 CO2 stabilization 1.25 1.35 1.22 1.32 1.56 1.20 0.79 0.71 0.81
CO2 concentration, ppm
b
Reference 422 430 436 485 507 544 711 746 875
450 CO2 stabilization 412 416 408 434 440 430 426 456 451
550 CO2 stabilization 421 427 421 478 490 472 535 562 526
CO2 price, $/ton
c
450 CO2 stabilization 41 36 88 157 127 230 166 173 1651
550 CO2 stabilization 3 6 26 10 19 67 127 115 475
% reduction in world GDP
d
450 CO2 stabilization 0.8 0.5 2.6 1.8 1.6 5.4 1.4 1.4 16.1
550 CO2 stabilization 0.0 0.0 0.7 0.2 0.2 1.8 0.7 1.0 6.8
US CO2 emissions, relative to 2000
Reference 1.25 1.10 1.40 1.27 1.20 2.00 1.63 1.34 2.93
450 CO2 stabilization 0.79 0.83 0.88 0.42 0.43 0.54 0.02 0.27 0.40
550 CO2 stabilization 1.24 1.05 1.04 1.02 0.98 1.13 0.29 0.37 0.59
EMF‐21
e lower end median upper end lower end median upper end lower end median upper end
Global CO2 emissions, relative to 2000
Reference 1.33 1.48 1.64 1.64 1.88 2.23 2.11 2.93 3.52
550 CO2 stabilization 1.17 1.25 1.41 1.13 1.25 1.41 0.66 0.90 1.25
CO2 price, $/ton
c
550 CO2 stabilization 3 1 32 1 1 23 39 9 3 19 2 1 6 6
% reduction in world GDP
d
550 CO2 stabilization 0.1 0.1 0.8 0.2 0.6 3.1 0.3 5.1 8.2
US CO2 emissions, relative to 2000
Reference 1.19 1.26 1.38 1.31 1.65 1.97 0.95 1.85 2.29
550 CO2 stabilization 1.05 1.14 1.22 0.76 1.02 1.26 0.36 0.53 1.05
Notes
aResults are from the Integrated Global Systems Model (IGSM), the Model for Evaluating Regional and Global Effects (MERGE) and MiniCAM Model.
See Clarke et al. (2007) for details.
bThe models stabilize concentrations of all GHGs, rather than CO2 alone (i.e., the CO2 equivalent concentration level is higher than the CO2 concentration).
Actual CO2 concentrations may temporarily overshoot the long run targets. 
cIn year 2000 dollars or thereabouts.
dGDP losses are not broken out by region in the models.  Losses include those from pricing CO2 and other GHGs on an equivalent basis. 
The figures do not account for the benefits of reduced climate change.
eModeling results from Stanford's Energy Modeling Forum, reported in de la Chesnaye and Weyant (2006). The results are from 16 models for CO2 prices 
and 12 models for GDP. Lower and upper ends correspond to lower and upper two‐thirds of model results. Atmospheric CO2 concentrations are not reported.
2025 2050 2100
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Figure 1. Steady State Warming Above Preindustrial Temperatures from Stabilization at 
Different GHG Concentrations 
 
Source: IPCC (2007), Table 10.8. 
 
Note: The black curve indicates the central case projection and the grey curves indicate the 66 percent 
confidence interval. 
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Figure 2. Selected Estimates of Contemporaneous World GDP Damages from Global Warming Occurring Around 2100 
 
 
Notes:   
* Only market damages were estimated in these studies. And the above figure is the midpoint of a range of damage estimates.   
** Damage categories are not precisely de-lineated in these studies.  
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